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In  a  setting  of  R&D  co-opetition  we  study,  by  using  an  all-pay  auction  approach,  how 
collaboration affects strategic decisions during a patent contest, and how the latter influences the 
possible  collaboration  network  structures  the  firms  can  hope  to  form.  The  all  pay  auction 
approach allows us to 1) endogenize both network formation and R&D intensities and 2) take 
heterogeneous  and  private  valuations  for  patents  into  account.  We  find  that,  different  from 
previous literature, the complete network is not always the only pairwise stable network, even and 
especially if the benefits from cooperating are important. Interestingly, the other possible stable 
networks all have the realistic property that some firms decide not to participate in the contest. 
Thus, weak cooperation through network formation can serve as a barrier to entry on the market 
for innovation. We further show that there need not be any network that survives a well known 
refinement  of  pairwise  stability,  strong  stability,  which  imposes  networks  to  be  immune  to 
coalitional deviations. 
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It is widely recognized that ￿rms invest in R&D in order to increase their com-
petitiveness and market power. Especially for high-tech sectors, ￿rms are typi-
cally engaged in R&D contests in order to be the ￿rst, and maybe the only, to
develop a new product/technology. In such an environment ￿rms generally have
the opportunity to develop some degree of collaboration. Historically, the litera-
ture modelling R&D competition has focused mainly on the two extremes of the
collaboration spectrum: pure R&D competition (patent race, contest etc.) or
full R&D cooperation (R&D Partnerships, Research Joint Ventures). That is,
situations in which ￿rms are either friends or foes. 1Recentely, more attention
has been devoted to instances in which ￿rms are both friends and foes: interme-
diate forms of collaboration in which ￿rms cooperate to strengthen their joint
position in R&D contests, without sharing the bene￿ts of winning the contest.
Nonetheless, the last decades witnessed an increasing number of R&D part-
nerships even among competing ￿rms (OECD [2001]). Second, it is shown
(Greenlee [2005]) that ￿rms adopt two types of cooperation: either ￿rms build
up Research Joint Ventures (RJV) where they coordinate resources (R&D labs,
scientists, etc.) and share the related results (technologies and products); or
￿rms choose weaker forms of R&D cooperation, like Cross Licensing, where
partners just share their knowledge without the need of coordinating their R&D
activity or sharing the R&D results. The existence of both types of cooperation
is con￿rmed by Roijakkers & Hagerdoon [2006] who show also that the share of
weak partneships in the Biotech and Pharmaceutical sectors has been increasing
during the last years.
Independently of the form of collaboration, it is clear that ￿rms cannot keep
up with their competitors without cooperating and competing with them at the
same time. For example, Anand & Khanna [2000] show that in the Electron-
ics and Computer sectors competing ￿rms usually cooperate via cross licensing
even for technologies not yet developed.Cohen et al. [2002] ￿nd that not even
high-tech but also low-tech Japanese ￿rms usually cooperate through cross li-
censing and other forms of information sharing more often and more extensively
than U.S. ￿rms.
1In particular, the latter stream of research has mainly focused on the welfare and/or the
antitrust implication of Research Joint Ventures. See Caloghirou et al. [2003] & Hagerdoon
et al. [1999] for a survey on research partnerships.
2Given these stylized facts a ￿rst goal of this paper is to provide a theo-
retical framework to analyze sectors featured by ￿R&D co-opetition￿ , namely
sectors where ￿rms cooperate in R&D before competing with one another for
the development of a new technology/product. In such a setting, two related
questions arise quite naturally: First, how does (weak) cooperation bene￿t ￿rms
in the competition stage and how does that in￿uence R&D activity? Second,
given the impact cooperation has on R&D activity, what are the likely patterns
of cooperation that will emerge?
A great deal of literature has focused on (a part of) this issue, but, as far
as we know, these two questions have not yet been analyzed jointly. Among
the papers that analyze patent races and R&D cooperation at the same time
(e.g. Martin [1995] and [2002], Stein [2008]) the contributions which are closer
to ours are Goyal & Joshi [2006] and Joshi [2008]. Both these papers propose a
two stage game model where in the ￿rst stage ￿rms cooperate in R&D while in
the second they participate in a patent race contest ￿ la Loury [1979].
Goyal & Joshi [2006] study endogenous network formation in a context of a
patent race where the R&D investment is exogenously given. In other words
question two has been answered ￿xing R&D behaviour exogenously. Their main
￿nding is that the complete network is the only one to be pairwise stable when
the linking costs are low. On the other hand, Joshi [2008], in a similar setting,
studies coalition formation game with endogenous R&D e⁄ort. Joshi thus an-
swers the two questions simultanously but coalition formation implies that ￿rms
strongly cooperate such that they both share the prize and coordinate the R&D
e⁄ort at the coalition level.2 Similarly to the previous paper, Joshi ￿nds that,
as the cost of participating in a coalition is low, the grand coalition is the only
one to be pairwise stable. In both papers the value of the patent is treated to be
the same for all ￿rms and moreover it is common knowlegde. One contribution
of our paper is to introduce heterogenous valuations for patents.
We answer the two above mentioned questions by developing a two stage
game. In the ￿rst one, we consider a network game where ￿rms can form
links with one another where a link a⁄ects (increases) the expected value of the
bene￿ts of winning the patent game. In the second stage, ￿rms are involved
in a patent contest which is in￿ uenced by the network structure realized in
the former stage. Di⁄erently from Goyal & Joshi [2006] and Joshi [2008] we
formalize such stage as an all-pay auction rather than a classical patent race.
2As we will see later on, Joshi motivates the choice of endogenizing the R&D e⁄ort at the
coalition level (rather than the individual one) because of a lack of tractability.
3The reason behind this is threefold. First, weak cooperation allows ￿rms to
increase their expected valuation for a patentable invention. This can be due to
the fact that ￿rms assess the future market for their potential patented product
di⁄erently, that they draw di⁄erent marginal costs, etc. In order to capture this
e⁄ect, we need to allow for the possibility that ￿rms di⁄er in their valuation for
the bene￿ts of obtaining a patent. When potential bene￿ts are di⁄erent among
the various competitors, this will likely have an impact on the e⁄orts dedicated
to innovation. Moreover, since this valuation is usually private information,
modeling the patent game as an all-pay auction with private information allows
us to take this into account.
Second, since we wish to model the incentive to form weak R&D links before
entering into the patent game, the expected payo⁄s of the latter will play a major
role in deciding which links to form. In order to perform this backward induction
approach, the expected payo⁄s of the patent game need to be tractable. As has
been pointed out by Joshi [2008] in a model of coalition formation in a race,
when research intensities are chosen non-cooperatively in a classic patent race
in which all ￿rms equally value the bene￿ts from the patent the equilibrium is
no longer tractable. The all-pay auction with private information allows us to
circumvent this problem by using the results of Parreiras and Rubinchik [2006].
Third, from a methodological point of view, as has been pointed out by Baye
and Hoppe [2003] there is quasi-equivalence3 between classic patent races and
rent seeking games, of which all pay auction is a special case through assuming
that the ￿rm with the highest R&D e⁄ort wins the patent game with probability
one.4
Hence, even though modelling the patent game as an all pay auction may
seem, at ￿rst sight, an oversimplifaction, it allows us to take a more general ap-
proach by taking heterogenous and private valuations for a patent into account,
while maintaining the spirit of the classic patent race (Loury) and, by doing so,
study the stability of weak R&D networks.
Once we have answered the above questions, it will be clear that when a ￿rm
decides to engage in R&D cooperation with a ￿rm, this will a⁄ect the expected
pro￿ts of all its (potential) rivals in the R&D contest. Network formation makes
a ￿rm stronger with respect to others and this may lead some rivals to decide
not to invest in R&D by exiting the market for innovation. Hence cooperation
through networks has the potential to act as a barrier to entry. Given this we
3In fact, in the limit where the interest rate is equal to zero, there exists an isomorphism
between the classic patent races and rent seeking contests.
4One could weaken the probability one assumption by mixing the all pay auction with a
lottery, but this would only complicate the analysis without changing the qualitative results.
4wish to know if this potential barrier to entry can arise in equilibrium. If the
answer is yes, then we provide an alternative explanation for why some ￿rms
may decide not to incur R&D e⁄orts, even though all ￿rms started o⁄ on equal
foot. In this situation, one may worry about a potential negative e⁄ect of weak
cooperation: by creating barrier of entry on the market for innovation, does it
reduce e¢ ciency?
Our main results are as follows. First we show that our set up allows us to
endogenize both R&D e⁄ort and network formation. Second, like Goyal & Joshi
[2006] and Joshi [2008] we ￿nd that the complete network is always pairwise sta-
ble as the cost of forming a link is not too high. However, when the bene￿t of
forming a link (i.e. a partnership) is large enough, there exist asymmetric pair-
wise stable networks which have the dominant group architecture: a non empty
set of ￿rms does not participate to the contest while all participating ￿rms form
links with one another. Therefore, when cooperation is of high strategic im-
portance, it becomes possible that some ￿rms decide, in equilibrium, NOT to
participate in the R&D contest, even when the cost of linking is negligible. As
mentioned above, the economic intuition behind our results is rather straightfor-
ward. Network formation between ￿rms leads to better prospects from a future
invention. By adding a link with another ￿rm, a ￿rm becomes a stronger partic-
ipant in the R&D contest. Firms that have few links can become so weak that,
for any possible valuation they may draw for the future invention (the patent),
the marginal bene￿t from any positive R&D amount is always lower than the
marginal cost, which makes them decide not to participate in the contest. Hence
link formation between some ￿rms can form a barrier to entry for other ￿rms,
strengthening the position of the former. In an example we show that a pair-
wise stable network with some ￿rms opting out of the market for innovation can
pareto dominate, from the point of view of the ￿rms, the network formed by the
grand coalition. Hence the barrier to entry is not necessarily welfare reducing.
When both types of networks are pairwise stable, we wish to re￿ne the
solution concept by studying which network structures are strongly stable by
imposing immunity to coalitional deviations (Jackson and van den Nouweland
[2005]). Unfortunately strong stability proves to be too strong a re￿nement as
we show, again by means of an example, that there need not be any network
surviving it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we introduce
the R&D cooperation stage (Section 2) followed by the competitive one (Section
3). In Section 4, we solve the model while in Section 5 we provide an example
of the model with ￿ve ￿rms. In Section 6 we study the strong stability issue
5while Section 7 concludes.
2 R&D Cooperation
Modeling Networks We consider a ￿nite set of ex-ante identical ￿rms N =
1;:::;n with n > 2. Then, a network game is a game where every ￿rm i 2 N
announces its intended link sij 2 f0;1g with all ￿rms j 6= i. If ￿rm i wants to
make a link with j, then sij = 1 and 0 otherwise.
Since ￿rm i has to decide whether to link or not with all its competitors,
then a strategy for a ￿rm i is given by si = fsijgj6=i, which is a n ￿ 1 vector
taken from the strategy set Si.
A link among ￿rms i and j will occur if and only if sij = 1 = sji, namely
when both agree to form the partnership. In the following we describe the






1 if i and j are linked
0 otherwise
A strategy pro￿le s = fs1;:::;sng induces a network g(s) which can arise
from the set of all the possible networks ￿. Therefore, a network g = f(ij)g is
a N ￿ N matrix describing all the pairwise links between the ￿rms. Let Ni(g)
be the set of ￿rms that have a link with ￿rm i given the network g. Then,
￿i(g) = jNi(g)j is the number of ￿rms linked with i. To simplify the notation,
g + ij means that the link ij is added to the network g. Similarly, g ￿ ij
corresponds to the network g without the link ij.
We say that there exists a path between i and j if either ij = 1 or if there
exists a sequence of l distinct players fk1;k2;:::klg such that ik1 = k1k2 = ::: =
kl￿1kl = klj = 1: Network g￿ is said to be a component of network g if for all i,
j, i 6= j belonging to g￿; there exists a path between i and j and for i 2 g￿ and
j 2 g; if ij = 1 then j 2 g￿:
The complete network gc is characterized by ￿i(gc) = n ￿ 1 for all i 2 N:
The empty network g0 is characterized by ￿i(gc) = 0 for all i 2 N.
A network g is said to have a dominant group structure when the component
ND(g) = fi 2 N;￿i(g) > 0g ( N is complete and all j = 2 ND(g) have no links:
￿j(g) = 0
Main assumptions and stability concept Once a network is induced, we
assume that each ￿rm pays a negligible but positive cost c > 0 per link formed.
6Given a strategy pro￿le s, the payo⁄ of ￿rm i is given by
￿i(si;s￿i) = ￿i(g(s)) ￿ c ￿ ￿i(g(s)) (1)




￿i) 8si 2 Si; 8i 2 N (2)
However, Nash Equilibrium in network theory is too weak a concept for modeling
network formation insofar as it allows the existence of too many equilibrium
networks.5 Therefore, we adopt a stronger stability concept proposed by Jackson
and Wolinsky [1996]; pairwise stability
De￿nition 1 (Pairwise Stability) A network g is pairwise stable (PWS) if
the following two conditions hold
1. there exists a Nash Equilibrium that supports g
2. 8ij = 2 g if ￿i(g + ij) > ￿i(g) ) ￿j(g + ij) < ￿j(g)
Intuitively, the two conditions state that, starting from a network g, no ￿rm
wants to sever a link (condition 1) and no couple of ￿rms want to form a new
one (condition 2).
When there is more than one pairwise stable network structure, it is useful
to consider a re￿nement introduced by Jackson and van den Nouweland [2005];
strong stability, which corresponds to the idea that a network should be immune
to coalitional deviations.
De￿nition 2 (Strong Stability) A network g is strongly stable (SS) if the
following two conditions hold
1. there exists a Nash Equilibrium that supports g
2. There does not exist a set of players N0 ￿ N and a network gN
0
(g) such
that, N0 can implement6 gN
0
(g) from network g such that 8i 2 N0 :
￿i(gN
0
(g)) > ￿i(g) with at least one i 2 N0 : ￿i(gN
0
(g)) > ￿i(g):
It is immediate that if a network is strongly stable, it is also pairwise stable.
The reverse is not always true.
5For example, the empty network is always a Nash Equilibrium: if no one has an incentive
to make a link with i, then the best strategy for i is to reject the link formation (sij = 0).
6Given network g;a set of players N0 ￿ N; can implement a network g0 from g through
deletion or adding of links solely by members of ￿ coalition￿N0:
73 R&D Competition
We now model how the formation of weak cooperation in￿ uences the (expected)
payo⁄s during the patent contests.
We assume that the creation of a new link ij allows ￿rms i and j to improve
their expected prospects from a patentable invention. More precisely we model
this by assuming that ￿rm￿ s i valuation of the patent given a network g;vi(g);
be uniformly distributed according to
vi(g) ￿ ￿i(g) = U[0;￿i(g)]; (3)
where ￿i(g) is the ex-ante maximal valuation of the patent given the network
g. This means that the support of the distribution of values depends on the
network g:
Given these assumptions each ￿rm chooses an R&D e⁄ort level ￿i 2 [0;1) in
order to maximize her expected payo⁄ from the all pay auction. We are looking
for an equilibrium of e⁄ort levels which is increasing in the valuation of the ￿rm.




￿j(￿j(￿)) ￿ ￿; (4)
where ￿j(￿) is the valuation of contestant j such that she also makes an












j(￿) = 1: (5)
The left hand side is the marginal bene￿t of an extra R&D e⁄ort: it is
the valuation for the invention times the increase in the probability of winning
the contest. The right hand side is the marginal cost. It could well be that
a contestant￿ s ￿rst order condition is negative, even for its highest possible
valuation7. In this case this ￿rm will not enter the race. This intuition was
con￿rmed formally by Perreiras and Rubinchik (2006) (condition 9 on page 18)
as they derived the following participation condition on the distributions of the
7Assume contestant i has no links (￿i ￿ 1) then if all other contestants have links such
that ￿j(g) becomes very large for all j 6= i; then likely ￿k(￿)￿
0
j(￿) will become very small
compared to ￿j(g): That is, in order to bid the same amount of contestant i they need to
draw a very low value ￿j(￿); compared to ￿j(g); and hence by contemplating to increase any
positive bid, contestant i can only marginally change the probability of winning.
8￿rms￿valuations: contestant i will not participate; ￿i(v) = 0 8v 2 [0;￿i(g)], if






j < (N ￿ 2): (6)
Once again, the intuition behind this result is that if these ￿rms participate
to the contest (exert a positive R&D e⁄ort), the marginal bene￿t of increasing
their e⁄ort (the increased probability of winning times their valuation) is always
smaller than the marginal cost and hence they are better o⁄ not participating
at all. In fact one can check that a ￿rm i will not participate, given the others
are participating, if its maximum valuation ￿i(g) is lower than (N ￿1)=N times
the harmonic mean of the maximum valuations ￿j(g) of all ￿rms j who partic-
ipate. This result mirrors the result obtained in Hillman and Riley (1989) for
a linear Tullock contest without private information. The driving force behind
the potential barrier to entry are the asymmetric valuations that stem from a
certain network structure. The more links one has, the more likely some ￿rms
will drop out, leaving fewer competitors for the prize.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the network g in which a ￿rm
j exits the race will be pairwaise stable. It could well be that there is always
another ￿rm i such that the network g + ij is mutually bene￿cial for i and j:
In order to answer this question we need to take a look at the payo⁄s of any
given network. Given any network g one can use condition 6 to eliminate all
non-active participants and study the payo⁄s of the contest with the remaining
￿rms. De￿ne F : ￿ ! P(N) to be a function from the set of networks to set of
subsets of ￿rms that selects all the active ￿rms for any given network structure
g: Let f(g) = #F(g): Then the ￿rst order conditions can be manipulated (see



















































Given these building blocks, we can summarize the timing of the patent
contest in three steps:
9STEP 1. The network g determines the distributions ￿i(g) of all ￿rms.
STEP 2. Each ￿rm decides whether to enter the contest or not. Following
Parreiras & Rubinchik [2006], a ￿rm i will participate to the race if and only if
the following condition is satis￿ed:





j > (N ￿ 2): (9)
is satis￿ed.
STEP 3. Each ￿rm i 2 F(g) draws its private valuation vi and makes a non
recoverable bid (proxy for R&D e⁄ort). The highest bidder wins the contest.
4 Solution
Before we study if there are pairwise stable networks, we will make two simplify-
ing assumptions. First, the support only depends on the amount of links a ￿rm
has: ￿i(g) = ￿i(￿i(g)): Second, we assume that there exists a multiplicative
e⁄ect8 on the expected maximal value ￿i in such way that:
￿i(g) = ￿i(￿i(g)) = ￿
￿i(g); ￿ > 1: (10)
In order to ￿nd out which partnership structures are pairwise stable, we
solve the model by backward induction. Given the expected payo⁄ functions
obtained above we obtain for any network g :
8i 2 F(g) : ￿i(g) =
￿i (￿iA￿i ￿ f(g) + 2)
2
(2￿iA￿i ￿ f(g) + 3)(1 + ￿iA￿i)
(11)






Given this equilibrium behavior and payo⁄s in stage two, which network
constellations are pairwise stable? In order to answer this question it is useful
to consider the payo⁄ of (a participating) ￿rm i when forming a link with ￿rm
8We thus assume the existence of a strong strategic incentive to cooperate which corrob-
orates empirical observations mentioned in the introduction. Even if this strong cooperative
environment exists, we will show that the complete network will not always be formed. We
make these assumption in order to be able to compare expected payo⁄s between network g
and network g + ij so as to be able to say something meaningful regarding pairwise stabil-
ity. No doubt, our result could hold for more general relationships between a network and
the distributions of valuations, but unfortunately, this comes at the cost of making general
conclusions regarding pairwise stability.
10j; given network g: Following Equation (10), the payo⁄ of ￿rm i in the network









￿￿j) ￿ f(g + ij) + 3
￿￿







Looking at the linking strategy, it is straightforward to see that, given a network
g and a negligible10 linking cost c, two ￿rms will have an incentive to form a
link if and only if both expected payo⁄s are strictly increasing
￿i(g + ij) > ￿i(g) and ￿j(g + ij) > ￿j(g)
which implies also that both ￿rms are willing to participate in the contest g+ij.
In particular, the decision to form a link is determined by the strength of
three e⁄ects. First, ￿rms i and j bene￿t directly from improving their ex-
pected valuation of the patent. Second, since the new partnership strengthens
the participation constraint of their competitors (Equation 9), partners bene￿t
indirectly if other ￿rms eventually decide to quit the race. Nevertheless, the
formation of a link also generates a competitive e⁄ect as the linking partners
become ￿ercer competitors, and as such a new link may be harmful for the
partners. However, comparing equations (11) and (13) we ￿nd the following
Lemma 1 (Cooperative e⁄ect dominance) If ￿rms i and j participate in
g and are not linked in g, then i and j always have an incentive to form the
network g + ij;8￿ > 1
￿i(g + ij) > ￿i(g) ; ￿j(g + ij) > ￿j(g) 8i;j 2 F(g):
Proof: See Appendix A.
In other words, the cooperative e⁄ect means that two non-connected competing
￿rms always have an incentive to cooperate. It is also immediately seen that:
Corollary 1 The expected payo⁄ of the patent game is increasing in the number
of links.
9A non participating ￿rm will prefer to abandon the race whenever the expected payo⁄
from entering the race is non positive.
10In fact there is a threshold value of c;e c; such that for all c < e c this is true. De￿ne, for 8
g 2 ￿; 8i 2 N;8j 2 N: ￿ = min
g;i;j
f￿i(g + ij) ￿ ￿i(g) j ￿i(g + ij) > ￿i(g)g
Since the maximum amount of links a ￿rm can form is N ￿ 1; then let e c = ￿
N￿1:
11Corollary 2 No ￿rms that participate to the contest in the event of being linked,
have an incentive to cut their link.
Consequently, we can conclude that
Proposition 1 The complete network gc is always pairwise stable.
Proposition 2 con￿rms the results found in Goyal & Joshi (2006) and Joshi
(2008): if the complete network (grand coalition) is formed, then no ￿rms have
an incentive to deviate. However, this does not exclude the existence of other
pairwise stable networks. In order to con￿rm the uniqueness result, we need
to analyze whether, given a network g 6= gc; there is always an incentive to
continue forming or deleting links. We show that, to the contrary, there can
always exist a set of ￿rms who remain outsiders for any additional link they are
o⁄ered.
Theorem 1 When ￿ is large enough, there exist asymmetric pairwise stable
R&D networks that have the dominant group structure
Proof: See Appendix B.
As a consequence, even when costs of linking are negligible the complete
network will not always be formed. Interestingly, this occurs when cooperation
is of high strategic importance (high ￿).
Theorem 1 states that the other possible pairwise stable networks are the
dominant group structure where ￿rms outside the main component do not par-
ticipate to the contest. We now provide a condition that characterizes all pair-
wise stable dominant group networks.
Proposition 2 Let gk be a dominant group network where the main component












< N ￿ 2: (14)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Naturally, if more than one equilibrium exists, we need to analyze if we can
rank the various equilibria using the pareto dominance criterion. Unfortunately,
the next proposition shows that the complete network can pareto dominate a
dominant group network and vice versa:
12Proposition 3 Let gk;:::gk :::gN￿1 be all pairwise stable dominant group net-










8 k = k:::N ￿ 1: (15)
Proof: See Appendix D.
In the next section we propose an example that illustrates our model.
5 An example
Suppose there are N = 5 ￿rms that want to discover a new technology. Some
possible network structures that can be formed are shown in Figure 1 and Figure
2. The ￿rst step to solve the model is to obtain the maximal ex-ante bene￿ts
￿i that ￿rms can get in each network. Then, since less connected ￿rms have a
lower payo⁄(Corollary 1) and consequently a higher chance of not participating
to the contest, we check when they satisfy their participation constraint. For
example, looking at network g3 (Figure 3), we ￿rst calculate the participation
constraints of ￿rms 4 and 5. If they are satis￿ed, we then calculate the payo⁄s
of the remaining ￿rms knowing that all ￿rms will participate to the race (i.e.
f(g3) = 5). If ￿rms 4 and 5 do not participate, we calculate the payo⁄ of the
other ￿rms knowing that f(g3) = 3:
5.1 Pairwise Stability (PWS)
From the previous section, we know that the possible pairwise stable networks
are the complete network gc and the dominant group networks gk where k =
2;3;4. (See for instance Figure 3,Figure 4 and Figure 5) Theorem 1 ensures
that the complete network is always PWS while Proposition 2 allows us to
verify when asymmetric dominant group networks are PWS. In particular:
































2 < 3 , ￿
3 ￿ 3￿
2 + 2￿ + 1 < 0;










< 3 , 3￿
3 ￿ 3￿ ￿ 1 > 0:
It is straightforward to see that PWS conditions for g2 and g3 are never
satis￿ed while g4 is PWS when ￿ is large enough (￿ > ￿4 ’ 1:137158). Therefore
in our example there are two PWS networks
￿ gc for any ￿ > 1
￿ g4 for any ￿ ￿ ￿4
Moreover, following Proposition 3, the complete network pareto dominates
g4 only when ￿ > 3=2.
6 Strong Stability (SS)
The example shows us that, for a considerable range of parameters, multiple
equilibria coexist. One can wonder whether it is possible to eliminate some of
the equilibria by looking at re￿nements of the pairwise stability concept. We
do so by studying strong stability, which demands pairwise stable networks to
be immune to coalitional deviations. When one pairwise stable network pareto
dominates another one, it is clear that there exists a coalitional deviation from
one to the other.11 Unfortunately, as we will see below, our above example
conveys that there need not exist any strongly stable network.
Lemma 2 A strongly stable network may fail to exist
6.1 An example (continued)
Recall that, a network g is SS when there is no coalition of players that ￿nds
it pro￿table to deviate from g to another network g0 (no matter whether g0 is
pairwise stable or not). Let us use the following notation
gX fi;j;kg
￿! gY
to indicate that players i, j and k deviate from network gX toward gY .
11Looking at our example this means that g4 is never SS as ￿ > 3=2 because a grand
coalition can pro￿tably deviate to the complete network.
14Strong Stability of network gc If the deviation gc f1;2;3;4g
￿! g4 is pro￿table,
then the complete network is not SS. In order to verify such pro￿tability, we
must distinguish two cases.
￿ If the deviation does not lead ￿rm 5 to drop out of the race (i.e. when
1 < ￿ <
3 p
4=3)), then deviating players i = 1;2;3;4 are better o⁄ if and
only if











Plotting such di⁄erence within the range 1 < ￿ <
3 p
4=3) (Figure 7), we
can immediately see that it is always satisifed. Consequently gc is not SS
in such range because it is always pro￿table to deviate from gc to g4.
￿ On the other hand, if the deviation forces ￿rm 5 to leave the race (i.e.
￿ ￿
3 p
4=3), then gc f1;2;3;4g
￿! g4 is pro￿table if and only if














4=3 ￿ ￿ < 3
2 the deviation gc f1;2;3;4g
￿! g4 is prof-
itable too.
Merging the two cases we have that the complete network is not SS for any
1 ￿ ￿ < 3
2. Moreover, one can prove that, whenever 3=2 < ￿ < 1:89414, three
￿rms will always ￿nd it pro￿table to deviate from the full network to a network
g
e k with two components of three and two ￿rms respectively.12 Therefore, even
though the complete network pareto dominates g4 it is still not SS when 3=2 <
￿ < b ￿ = 1:89414.
Strong Stability of network g4 About the strong stability of g4, note that
since g4 is not PWS while gc is not SS as 1 < ￿ < ￿4, this means that there is
no SS network in this range.
However we know that g4 is PWS for any ￿ ￿ ￿4. Is it possible that g4 is
SS when ￿4 ￿ ￿ < 3
2? To answer this question, let us consider the following
deviation g4 f1;2;3g
￿! g3.
12This is due to the fact that in such network both outsiders always participate so that the
other three ￿rms will deviate only when
￿i(g
e k) > ￿i(gc) ,
￿2(2￿ ￿ 1)2




a condition that is satis￿ed as 3=2 < ￿ < 1:89414.
15￿ If ￿4 ￿ ￿ <
q
3
2, outsiders of the component participate. Therefore, the
deviation g4 f1;2;3g
￿! g3 is pro￿table if and only if












Plotting such di⁄erence for any value of ￿ inside [￿4;
p
3=2] we can immedi-




network g4 is PWS but not strongly stable.
￿ On the other hand, outsiders do not participate for
q
3
2 ￿ ￿ < 3
2. There-
fore, a deviation to g3 is pro￿table only when












which means that it is always pro￿table to deviate from g4 to g3 whenever q
3
2 ￿ ￿ < 3
2.
As a consequence of these results, network g4 is PWS but never SS when
￿4 ￿ ￿ < 3
2.
Given that g4 and gc are never SS while all the other networks are not PWS,
there is no strongly stable network whenever ￿ 2 [1;b ￿]. Such result clearly
indicates that strong stability may be too strong a re￿nement with respect to
pairwise stability.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we provide a theoretical background to sectors featured by R&D
co-opetition, namely sectors where ￿rms cooperate in R&D even though they
compete in a patent contest. Our analysis started from the observation that,
during the last years, there has been an increasing number of weak partnerships
among ￿rms that compete for the development of new products/technologies.
In this setting, we studied, by using an all-pay auction approach, how this
weak collaboration a⁄ects strategic decisions during the patent contest itself,
and how the latter in￿ uences the possible network structures the ￿rms can hope
to form. The all pay auction approach allows us to 1) endogenize both network
formation and R&D intensities and 2) take heterogeneous and private valuations
for patents into account.
We ￿nd that, di⁄erent from previous literature, the complete network is not
always the only pairwise stable network, even and especially if the bene￿ts from
cooperating are important. Interestingly, the other possible stable networks
16all have the realistic property that some ￿rms decide not to participate in the
contest. In other words, network formation can serve as an endogenous barrier
to entry.
We further show that there need not be any network that survives a well
known re￿nement of pairwise stability; strong stability, which imposes networks
to be immune to coalitional deviations.
A Proof of Lemma 1









￿j) ￿ f(g) + 3
￿￿
1 + ￿i(Ap + 1
￿j)
￿;




￿ ￿i(Ap + 1
￿ ￿j) ￿ f(g + ij) + 2
￿2
￿
2￿ ￿i(Ap + 1
￿ ￿j) ￿ f(g + ij) + 3
￿￿
1 + ￿ ￿i(Ap + 1
￿ ￿j)
￿;
where ￿ > 1. Suppose for simplicity that f(g) = f(g+ij) = f ￿ N, namely that
no ￿rm decides not to participate.13 Taking the di⁄erence of the log-pro￿ts, a
new link is pro￿table when




￿ ￿i(Ap + 1
￿ ￿j) ￿ f + 2
￿i(Ap + 1
￿j) ￿ f + 2
￿log
2￿ ￿i(Ap + 1
￿ ￿j) ￿ f + 3
2￿i(Ap + 1
￿j) ￿ f + 3
￿ log
1 + ￿ ￿i(Ap + 1
￿ ￿j)
1 + ￿i(Ap + 1
￿j)
:
Simplifying some terms we have
log￿i(g + ij) ￿ log￿i(g) = log￿ + 2log
￿ ￿iAp + ￿i
￿j ￿ f + 2
￿iAp + ￿i
￿j ￿ f + 2
￿log
2 ￿ ￿iAp + ￿i
￿j ￿ f + 3
2 ￿iAp + ￿i
￿j ￿ f + 3
￿ log
1 + ￿ ￿iAp + ￿i
￿j
1 + ￿iAp + ￿i
￿j
:
Rewriting ￿ = 1 +   and simplifying





￿j ￿ f + 2
#
13Since such assumption excludes the indirect bene￿t that some competitors could give up
because of this new link, we are actually considering the least favorable condition for the
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it is su¢ cient to prove that A and B are always positive.
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￿f+2 ) f￿1 ￿ 0:












2   ￿iAp
2 ￿iAp + ￿i
￿j ￿ f + 3
#
:
A simple way to check this condition is to see when the right hand side is
dominated by either the ￿rst term or the second one of the left hand side. The
LHS ￿rst term dominates the RHS when14
log(1+ ) ￿ log
"
1 +
2   ￿iAp
2 ￿iAp + ￿i
￿j ￿ f + 3
#
,   ￿
2   ￿iAp
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￿ f + 3 ￿ 2 ￿iAp ,
￿i
￿j
￿ f ￿ 3:
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￿j ￿ f + 3
,
14Note that since the participation condition for ￿rm i requires that ￿iAp +
￿i
￿j ￿ N ￿ 2,














￿ f ￿ 1:
This means that, for any value of f, the ￿rst and/or the second term of the left
hand side dominate(s) the RHS. Therefore B is always positive. Concluding,
since A and B are always positive, it is always bene￿cial to form a link with
another partner.
B Proof of Theorem 1
First, by Lemma 1 we know that all participating ￿rms will always form a
complete component. Second, a ￿rm i will not form a link when






It is straightforward to see that when two competitors form a new link they
reduce the right hand side of the participation constraint while the left hand
side is constant. Therefore, as ￿ is high enough and ￿rms j 6= i are su¢ ciently
linked, it is possible that ￿rm i does not participate in the network g + ij for
any j participating ￿rm. Finally, equation 1 implies that a non participating
￿rm i always has an incentive to stay isolated. Q.E.D.
C Proof of Proposition 2
Let us consider a network gk where the dominant group consists of k ￿rms
while all the others are isolated and non participating ￿rms. In order not to
participate outsider ￿rms must not only violate their participation constraint,
￿





< N ￿ 2;
but they also have to stay out even when they can form a new link
￿ with a member of the component
￿
￿








< N ￿ 2; (16)
￿ with another outsider
￿
￿







< N ￿ 2: (17)
19Network gk is PWS only when all these conditions hold. However, we can
show that Equation (16) is the most restrictive.



























k￿1+(k￿1)(￿￿1) > 0 ,
(￿ ￿ 1)
h
(N ￿ k ￿ 1)￿
k￿1 + (k ￿ 1)
i
> 0;
a condition that is always satis￿ed.
































k + 1 > ￿ + ￿
k￿1 , ￿
k￿1(￿ ￿ 1) > (￿ ￿ 1) ,
(￿
k￿1 ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ 1) > 0;
which is always true. Therefore, Equation(16) is the most restrictive condition
for the PWS of a dominant group network.Q.E.D.
D Proof of Proposition 3
It is straightforward to see that moving from a dominant group network to
the complete one, ￿rms that were outside the component are better o⁄ insofar
as their payo⁄ becomes strictly positive instead of being null. Therefore, the
complete network pareto dominates a dominant group network gk only when all
component members i are better o⁄ when they move from gk to gc, namely














Consequently, the complete network pareto dominates all the other PWS net-
works only when Equation (18) holds for any k = k;:::;N ￿ 1. Q.E.D.
20Figure 1: An example of a network with 5 ￿rms
E Figures
21Figure 2: Example of a network with an isolated ￿rm
Figure 3: Three-￿rm group dominant network g3
22Figure 4: Four-￿rm group dominant network g4
Figure 5: The complete network gc






Figure 7: ￿i(g3) ￿ ￿i(g4) as ￿ 2 [￿4;3=2]
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